Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
Despite the extensive scope of US military medical assdstance to Honduras, the perceptions of Honduran health leaders towards these activities is largely unknown. The opinion of Ministry of Health (MOH) officials is important for several reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that all humanitarian medical assistance will be of maximal benefit when it is delivered in an organized fashion, with the MOH being the logical choice for lead coordmating agency. Second, US foreign policy objectives such as supporting democratic institutions are Ukely to be linked with host nation leaders' opinions of assistance programs. Fmally, MOH opinion will help assess effectiveness of civic assistance programs as well as provide insight towards improving these activities.
Several concerns with medical civic assistance programs lend ftirther rationale for this study. For example, in a 1993 report to the Congress, the General Accounting Ofifice (GAO) reported that civic assistance programs in several countries, including Honduras, were not meeting host nation needs.2.3 Also, it is the opinion of some international aid experts that because aid programs reinforce poor nations' feelings of powerlessness, aid programs eventually lead to recipient resentment towards donors,^ In the specific case of Honduras, Weisser (1993) Questionnaires were personally delivered during June of 2002, Most subjects were given at least one week to complete the questionnaire, with retrieval from their office at a latter date. To encourage candid, forthriglit responses, assurance of anonymity was given to participants; they were instructed not to write their name on the form. In addition, subjects were assured that data would only be reported in aggregate form. All responses were sealed in unidentifiable envelopes, combined together, and not opened until the investigator returned to the United States. Twelve questionnaires were returned, one was blank, giving a total completion rate of 11/16 or 69%.
Responses were translated to English by a native Spanish speaker not associated with the project. The responses to each question were aggregated and qualitatively evaluated for content; grouping responses into general themes and identifying the frequency of each type of response. Although the data were collected and analyzed in a systematic and organized fashion, the intent of the study was to uncover generally held opinion and not to gather quantitative data. Tests of statistical significance, therefore, were neither done nor would be appropriate for this study. These findings indicate that most top-level MOH personnel are aware of the US military medical activities, and that many associate them with, the US presence at "Palmerola" (JTF-Bravo). They generally beUeve that the most common activity engaged in by US militaiy-medics is the "medical brigades", medrete missions to remote parts of the country. Many are also aware of a wide variety of other activities perfonned by US military medical personnel. It is also clear that the majority feel that these interventions could be more effectively coordinated through the national MOH. Given these results, I believe that increasing national MOH involvement vvill result in greater practical and political benefits for all parties.
A good starting point would be approaching the MOH's External Cooperation Unit regarding all anticipated activities. This department was created specifically to coordinate all foreign medical assistance provided to Honduras. An approval process is required prior to providing medical assistance; with the MOH retaining the option of rejecting programs that that they deem inappropriate. This is in line with previous recommendations for emergency foreign assistance during disasters'^ and is even more logical when discussing non-emergency aid At the tune of my investigation, the leader of this department stated that no US military personnel or representatives had ever contacted her, but that she welcomed such contact.
The model I propose would take into account MOH objectives, US military training objectives, and US foreign policy objectives. The goal would be to plan and execute only those interventions in which MOH, military training, and foreign policy objectives overlap (see figure 1 ). Using this model, the MOH would be the lead agent in accepting or rejecting planned interventions. US military planners would offer aid in ways liiat either meet military training or foreign policy objectives, but also support MOH interests. Ideally, both parties would work to maximize efforts in ways that all three objectives could be enhanced. 
